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DUAL SOVEREIGNTY IN TRADITIONAL JUDAISM  




In the course of his lecture, Professor Levinson remarked: 
“[A]ll of us believe that there must be some limits to political au-
thority, even if we might disagree on the source of such limitation.”  
This is the core principle of liberal government, and as Levinson well 
knows, many creeds—secular and religious—do not accept it. 
One classic ground of limits is the direct rational or intuitive 
apprehension of moral laws.  Levinson gestures toward this when he 
speaks of individuals subject to sovereign authority who believe that 
the sovereign is commanding “grotesque injustice.”  As he notes, un-
der the aegis of some theological positions, individual awareness of 
moral restraints can serve as limitations on divine as well as earthly 
sovereignty.  As Abraham famously asks, “Shall not the Judge of all 
the earth do right?”1  (I leave open the question, raised by David No-
vak, of whether there is a Jewish equivalent of natural law or right.)2 
It is odd to describe reason as an alternative “sovereign”; not 
so when the source of governmental limits lies in principles that are 
divinely ordained and acts that are divinely commanded.  God is so-
vereign—indeed, many believe, the ultimate sovereign.  However, 
the challenge that revealed religion poses for civil government is any-
thing but straightforward. 
Speaking broadly and schematically, there are three possible 
relations between political and religious authority.  First, political au-
 
                                                                                                                                      
* William A. Galston serves as a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute where he holds a 
chair in the Governance Studies Program.  As an expert on elections, political campaigns, 
and domestic policy, Mr. Galston previously served as a policy advisor to President Clinton 
and other presidential candidates.  His research is currently focused on crafting “a new social 
contract and the implications of political polarization.”  William A. Galston, BROOKINGS, 
http://www.brookings.edu/experts/galstonw?view=bio (last visited Feb. 17, 2013). 
1 Genesis 18:25. 
2 See generally DAVID NOVAK, NATURAL LAW IN JUDAISM (1998) (arguing that there is a 
Jewish equivalent of natural law or right). 
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thority may be comprehensively dominant over religion, which is 
seen as serving state power (and for this reason is often called “civil” 
religion).  Second, and conversely, religious authority may coincide 
with, or comprehensively dominate, political authority, yielding some 
version of theocracy.  Third, political and religious authority may 
coexist without either enjoying a comprehensive dominance.  One 
version of this position seeks to divide social life into different 
spheres, dominated by either politics or faith.  (Maxims such as 
“Render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s” provide the basis for such an 
understanding.)  It is hard to come by such neat surgical divisions, 
however.  More typically, the coexistence model implies overlapping 
and conflicting claims, generating the need for both theoretical clari-
fication and case-specific judgment, which in constitutional demo-
cracies often takes the form of legal adjudication.3 
Levinson discusses an instance of this—Justice Scalia’s ref-
lections on the relation between his duties as a judge in a constitu-
tional democracy and his duties to God as a Roman Catholic.4  If the 
United States Constitution were to compel him to participate actively 
in an act that Catholic doctrine bindingly declares to be immoral, he 
would have no choice but to resign his office.  While the Justice in-
sists that his duty to God takes priority, he does not assert the right to 
 
                                                                                                                                      
3 See generally William A. Galston, Religious Violence or Religious Pluralism: The Es-
sential Choice, in RELIGION, THE ENLIGHTENMENT, AND THE NEW GLOBAL ORDER 37, 38 
(John M. Owen IV & J. Judd Owen  eds., 2010).  Editor’s Note: This paragraph and the fol-
lowing section is reprinted from the aforementioned source with additional commentary.  
See Matthew 22:21; see, e.g., Yehudah Mirsky, Note, Civil Religion and the Establishment 
Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237, 1250-51 (1986) (“Though not sacral in itself, a civil religion 
draws on the various sacral religious traditions of a society. . . .  A civil religion gathers and 
expresses the most deeply felt, abiding ideals and attitudes of a society’s political life.  By 
drawing on the form and language of sacral religion it achieves a special resonance and 
power.”); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422-24 (1962) (finding that New York State’s poli-
cy of encouraging students to recite a religious prayer in school violated the Establishment 
Clause of the United States Constitution); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 
18 (1947) (discussing the use of New Jersey taxpayer funds to pay for public transportation 
of children to Catholic schools and reasoning that this practice does not violate the First 
Amendment because the amendment “requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with 
groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their ad-
versary.  State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor 
them”). 
4 Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours, Adapted from remarks made at the University 
of Chicago Divinity School during a conference sponsored by The Pew Forum on Religion 
& Public Life, available at http://www.prodeathpenalty.com/scalia.htm (“(I am judicially 
and judiciously neutral . . . .) I do not find the death penalty immoral.  I am happy to have 
reached that conclusion, because I like my job, and would rather not resign.”). 
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impose his understanding of God’s laws on the rest of the country.  
On the contrary, reinterpreting the Constitution so as to eliminate the 
clash between divine and human law would violate his judicial oath. 
This position is hardly theocratic, as some have charged.  If it 
were, our only Catholic president would be guilty of theocracy.  In 
his famous speech to the Protestant ministers, President John F. Ken-
nedy did his best to minimize the tension between his presidential du-
ties and the dictates of his faith.5  However, he concluded: “But if the 
time should ever come . . . when my office would require me to ei-
ther violate my conscience or violate the national interest, then I 
would resign the office; and I hope any conscientious public servant 
would do the same.”6 
The arguments espoused by both Scalia and Kennedy rest on 
an unstated premise: their faith commands them negatively—not to 
perpetrate evil directly—but not positively, to do whatever they can 
to promote the good as the Church understands it.  Catholicism did 
not always make this distinction, which is one reason why relatively 
few Catholics were chosen to occupy high offices under our Consti-
tution until quite recently.7 
Dramatic as principled resignation always is, the clash be-
tween religious authority and high civil office does not raise the most 
vexing problems.  While individuals in question pay a personal price, 
they can live freely as private citizens, and others can capably dis-
charge the duties of the vacated offices.  The cost can be higher when 
religious institutions are forced to choose between their mission and 
their convictions.  In recent years, some Catholic adoption agencies 
have felt compelled to cease operation because they would not refer 
potential adoptees to gay or lesbian couples and a Catholic organiza-
tion fighting international sex trafficking withdrew as a result of its 
refusal to refer the women it rescued to abortion providers.8 
 
                                                                                                                                      
5 Transcript: JFK’s Speech on His Religion, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 5, 2007), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16920600. 
6 Id. 
7 See Faith on the Hill: The Religious Composition of the 112th Congress, THE PEW F. ON 
RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, http://www.pewforum.org/Government/Faith-on-the-Hill--The-
Religious-Composition-of-the-112th-Congress.aspx (last updated Feb. 28, 2011) (indicating 
that in 1961 Catholics made up 19% of Congress and in 2011 Catholics made up 29%); The 
Religious Affiliations of U.S. Presidents, THE PEW F. ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE (Jan. 15, 
2009), http://www.pewforum.org/The-Religious-Affiliations-of-US-Presidents.aspx. 
8 See, e.g., Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 567 
F.3d 595, 597 (9th Cir. 2009) (involving the issue of “adoption . . . by same-sex couples and 
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The most fundamental clash implicates neither office-holders 
nor voluntary associations, but rather individual citizens.  If the state 
orders the faithful to participate in what they regard as evil, they may 
have no choice but to refuse.  Justice Scalia criticizes a certain under-
standing of democracy for suggesting that, “a democratic govern-
ment, being nothing more than the composite will of its individual 
citizens, has no more moral power or authority than they do as indi-
viduals.”9  This stance, he says, fosters civil disobedience.10  And so 
it can.  But unless one believes that civil authority and Catholic doc-
trine always coincide—which Scalia does not—or that in cases of 
conflict civil authority always takes precedence—which Scalia does 
not—then in principle, Catholic citizens may find themselves com-
pelled to disregard the law.11  Although the specific flash points dif-
fer, every account of dual sovereignty poses this difficulty.  For in-
stance: Few individual believers or faith communities can be satisfied 
with the civic republican approach, which embodies an ordering of 
values antithetical to most religious commitments.  As the history of 
European nations with deep civic republican traditions shows, the ef-
fort to demote religion to purely civil status is bound to spark politi-
cal conflict and, on occasion, actual violence.12  Even when anti-
clericalism abates, as it eventually did in France and throughout Eu-
rope, the systematic expulsion of all expressions of faith from the 
public square inevitably impinges on what most believers (and most 
Americans) would regard as the minimal conditions of free exercise. 
The theocratic option fares no better.  Whatever may be the 
case for homogeneous communities espousing a single faith (few of 
any size do so), the theocratic impulse creates grave difficulties for 
societies with multiple faith communities and individuals who reject 
religion as well.  In circumstances of diversity, a serious religious es-
tablishment (as distinguished from, say, the increasingly symbolic 
 
the Catholic Church[]”); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Mass. v. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 
474, 476 (D. Mass. 2012) (involving the issue of abortion services referrals and the Catholic 
Church). 
9 Scalia, supra note 4. 
10 Id. 
11 See McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 891, 912 
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (commenting on the tension between civil and religious law); 
see also Scalia, supra note 4 (explaining his personal views on the conflict of religion and 
civil law). 
12 See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Go-
vernmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 72-73 (1998) (discussing the political conflict be-
tween the secular and religious in Europe). 
4
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role of the Church of England) will inevitably use legal coercion to 
impose its views on faith communities that conscientiously reject 
them.13  Here again, political conflict will tend to spill over into epi-
sodes of violent resistance. 
That leaves the coexistence model, a mode of plural sove-
reignty that rejects any comprehensive hierarchy between political 
and religious authority claims and that insists on horizontal relations 
among faith communities.  By definition, this liberal option is bound 
to leave both theocrats and civic republicans dissatisfied, but it holds 
out the hope of maximizing the expressive opportunities for individ-
uals and faith communities—and of reducing coercion to the mini-
mum that civic order requires.  As we have seen, it also requires in-
stitutions that can contain the consequences of the conflicts between 
religious and civil authority that will break out from time to time. 
I. “CLAIMS OF POLITICS AND CLAIMS OF FAITH” IN 
TRADITIONAL JUDAISM14 
Modern Catholicism presents a clear case of a formerly theo-
cratic faith that has evolved theologically toward reconciliation with 
liberal constitutionalism.  Jews who do not consider themselves 
bound by the halakha find liberal constitutionalism easy to embrace.  
Indeed, they have often been its most fervent defenders. 
One might imagine, however, that traditional Judaism inevit-
ably leans toward theocracy.  It is easy enough to find examples of 
theocratic governance in Biblical texts.  If traditional Judaism were 
unequivocally theocratic, this would create a deep gulf with liberal 
democratic politics.  Fortunately for traditionalist American Jews, 
there is a long line of Biblical and Talmudic interpretation that leads 
to at least a qualified endorsement of government that is both secular 
 
                                                                                                                                      
13 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Need for a Wall Separating Church and State, in 
RELIGION AS A PUBLIC GOOD: JEWS AND OTHER AMERICANS ON RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC 
SQUARE 91, 98 (Alan Mittleman ed., 2003) (discussing the need to separate government and 
religion). 
14 See generally William A. Galston, Traditional Judaism and American Citizenship, in 
RELIGION AS A PUBLIC GOOD: JEWS AND OTHER AMERICANS ON RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC 
SQUARE, 127, 127-33 (Alan Mittleman ed., 2003) & William A. Galston, Religious Violence 
or Religious Pluralism: The Essential Choice, in RELIGION, THE ENLIGHTENMENT, AND THE 
NEW GLOBAL ORDER 37, 50-51 (John M. Owen IV & J. Judd Owen eds., 2010).  Editor’s 
Note: The following section is reprinted from the aforementioned source with additional 
commentary. 
5
Galston: Dual Sovereignty in Traditional Judaism
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
280 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
and limited. 
Read literally, the authority established by the laws of 
Moses was theocratic and, if the Book of Judges is to be taken as 
history, was exercised theocratically for an extended period.15  
Gideon famously refused the people’s demand that he become king 
over Israel: “I will not rule over you myself; nor shall my son rule 
over you; the Lord alone shall rule over you.”16 
There was a problem, however—the Lord ruled, not directly, 
but through human intermediaries.  What would happen when these 
theocratic authorities, the “judges,” strayed from the true path?  Sa-
muel, the last of the judges, was a righteous man, but his sons were 
not: “they were bent on gain, they accepted bribes, and they sub-
verted justice.”17  The leaders of the people gathered to request that 
Samuel “appoint a king for us, to govern us like all the other na-
tions.”18  Samuel resisted their demands, to no avail.  The elders in-
sisted that the administration of justice and the conduct of war made 
kingship necessary: “We must have a king over us . . . [to] rule over 
us and go out at our head and fight our battles.”19  In the end, the 
Lord said to Samuel, “Heed their demands and appoint a king for 
them.”20 
Although the Lord also tells Samuel that the people’s demand 
for a king means that “it is Me they have rejected as their king,” the 
Bible does not characterize kingship as wrong in the same way that 
idolatry is wrong.21  Indeed, the period before kings is linked to sto-
ries of strife and disorder.22  Without a king, “everyone did as he 
pleased.”23  It seems that the establishment of non-theocratic authori-
ty was needed to prevent the Jewish people from swallowing one 
another alive.  Rightly understood, kings can perform limited but crit-
ical nontheological functions: ensuring public order, administering 
 
                                                                                                                                      
15 3 THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES, BOOK FOURTEEN: THE BOOK OF JUDGES 5:1-5:31 (Julian 
Obermann, Louis Ginzberg & Harry A. Wolfson eds., Abraham M. Hershman trans., 1977). 
16 See Judges 8:23. 
17 Nevi’im, I Samuel 8.3. 
18 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
19 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
20 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
21 Id. 
22 See, e.g., 1 THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION: AUTHORITY 116 (Michael Walzer, Me-
nachem Lorberbaum & Noah J. Zohar eds., Yair Lorberbaum co-ed., 2000). 
23 Nevi’im Judges 21.11. 
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justice, and safeguarding the people against external danger.24 
As the discussion of this matter developed during the Tal-
mudic and medieval periods, kingship became a metaphor for secular 
government in general.25  Nissim Gerondi, a leader of the Barcelona 
Jewish community, argued explicitly for two “separate agenc[ies],” 
one to judge the people in accordance with Torah law, the other to 
uphold public order.26  The precedent for this, he insisted, was estab-
lished during the Biblical period: “[A]t a time when Israel had both 
Sanhedrin and king, the Sanhedrin’s role was to judge the people ac-
cording to just [Torah] law only and not to order their affairs in any 
way beyond this, unless the king delegated his powers to them.”27 
Gerondi accepted that the secular authority would need to use 
coercion “to enhance political order . . . and in accordance with the 
needs of the hour, even if [the application of force] is undeserved ac-
cording to truly just [Torah] law.”28  He went so far as to acknowl-
edge that “some of the laws and procedures of the [gentile] nations 
may be more effective in enhancing political order than some of the 
Torah’s laws.”29  No matter, the king would correct these deficien-
cies, acting in the name of political order.30
  
The secular authority, in 
short, has one sphere of authority, religious leaders another; and the 
former need not always give way to the latter in cases of conflict.  
The aims of Torah law may be more elevated, but the aims of secular 
law may be more urgent.  Sometimes efforts to achieve a spiritually 
good life must yield to the necessity of preserving life itself. 
Once the legitimacy of two authorities, one secular, the other 
religious, was accepted, a question necessarily arose concerning the 
relation between them.  This question assumed particular urgency af-
ter the fall of the Jewish commonwealth and the dispersion of the 
Jews among the nations of the earth.
 
 Shmuel, an authority of the ear-
ly Talmudic period, laid down a principle that became central to all 
subsequent discussion of this issue: “The law of the [secular] king-
 
                                                                                                                                      
24 See THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION, supra note 22, at 152 (outlining the civil respon-
sibilities of a king). 
25 See id. at 115 (discussing how kings were seen in a civil context). 
26 Id. at 156-57. 
27 Id. at 159. 
28 Id. at 156. 
29 THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION, supra note 22, at 158 (alteration in original). 
30 Id. 
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dom is law.”31 
This might seem to give secular authority plenipotentiary 
power over the Jewish community subject to its jurisdiction.  Over 
time, however, two important limitations emerged—one formal, the 
other substantive.  In the Mishneh Torah, Maimonides articulated a 
version of the principle that we now call “equal protection,” which he 
used to distinguish between genuine laws and arbitrary decrees: 
The general rule is: any law promulgated by the king 
to apply to everyone and not to one person alone is not 
deemed robbery.  But whatever he takes from one par-
ticular person only, not in accordance with a law 
known to everyone but [rather] by doing violence to 
this person, is deemed robbery.32 
To be valid, law must comply with the requirements of formal 
justice.  When secular authority disregards these formal require-
ments, it exceeds its just powers and may be criticized, even resisted, 
if circumstances permit.  Alongside this formal restraint, there devel-
oped a substantive limitation on the content of secular law that Jews 
were required to obey.
  
In the course of answering questions posed by 
Napoleon to the Jews of France, Ishmael of Modena observed that 
“[a]ll the [interpreters of Shmuel’s principle] have written that as 
long as the laws of the kingdom do not contradict Torah law, we 
must abide by them.”33 
But what does it mean to “contradict” the Torah?  The max-
imalist interpretation would be that civil law contradicts the Torah if 
and to the extent it deviates from Torah law.  To say this, however, 
would be to undermine virtually all civil law, contradicting the inten-
tion of the basic principle.  The most widely accepted interpretation, 
historically and down to the present, is that civil law is valid when it 
“does not contravene an explicit statement of the Torah.”34  Civil law 
loses its claim to be obeyed if it commands something that the Torah 
forbids, or forbids something that the Torah commands. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 31 Dina De-Malkhuta Dina, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ 
jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0005_0_05228.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).  
32 9 THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES, BOOK ELEVEN: THE BOOK OF TORTS 5:14 (Julian Ober-
mann, ed., Hyman Klein trans., 1954). 
33 THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION, supra note 22, at 451.  
34 Ovadyah Haddayah, Does “Dina de-Malkhuta Dina” Apply to the State of Israel?, in 
THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION, supra note 22, at 477.  
8
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As Maimonides puts it: 
Whoever disobeys a royal decree because he is en-
gaged in the performance of a religious command 
[mitzvah], even if it be a light command, is not liable, 
because (when there is a conflict) between the edict of 
the Master (God) and the edict of the servant (the 
king), the former takes precedence of the latter.35 
And, he adds, “It goes without saying that if the king issues an order 
annulling a religious precept, no heed is paid to it.”36 
It does not follow, however, that traditional Jews are always 
required to disobey civil law when such conflicts arise.  A few civil 
demands (such as mandatory idolatry) must be resisted, to the death 
if need be.  In most cases, however, it is permissible to take into ac-
count the severity of the consequences of disobedience. 
The legal structures of traditional (rabbinic) Judaism, in 
short, developed over a period of nearly two millennia during 
which Jews were a nearly powerless minority in the states they in-
habited.  The religious practices, such as the rituals of the Temple, 
that presupposed Jewish sovereignty in Israel fell into desuetude 
and were not revived—even after the reestablishment of a Jewish 
state in Israel in 1947. 
During the founding period, to be sure, there were some tradi-
tionalists who urged the supremacy of religious over political au-
thorities and who were bitterly disappointed when this failed to de-
velop.  Isaac Halevi Herzog, a prominent religious and legal authority 
who welcomed the establishment of the state and became its first 
chief rabbi, writes that he “aspired to create a powerful movement 
among us whose purpose would be to influence the future legislative 
council to include in the constitution a basic clause stipulating that 
the law of the state will be Torah law.”37  For him, it was “inconceiv-
able that the laws of the Torah should allow for two parallel authori-
ties.”38 
But not only were modernizing Jews opposed to state imposi-
tion of Torah law; so were many traditionalist Jews who did not see 
how a system predicated on millennia of political powerlessness 
 
                                                                                                                                      
35 THE BOOK OF JUDGES, supra note 14, at 214 (first alteration in original). 
36 Id. 
37 THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION, supra note 22, at 473. 
38 Id. at 475. 
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could possibly serve as the legal framework for a modern state.  The 
result was a political order in which secular and religious authorities 
uneasily coexist.  The rabbinate exercises total control over the “pri-
vate” laws of marriage and divorce for Jews.  The state exercises to-
tal control over civil functions such as economic regulation and na-
tional defense; Orthodox Jews use political power to bend civil 
authority toward, e.g., enforcing Torah-based laws of kashrut and the 
Sabbath and granting religious students exemption from military ser-
vice.  And then there are constant boundary disputes over questions 
such as “Who is a Jew?” the answer to which determines the scope of 
the famous Law of Return guaranteeing the rights of unimpeded im-
migration and instant citizenship to Jews everywhere.  While it 
would be an exaggeration to say that Jewish traditionalism has fully 
made its peace with democratic pluralism, there is a rough modus vi-
vendi on many points. 
Many, but not all.  Citing their interpretation of God’s prom-
ise to the Jewish people, some Orthodox leaders have incited reli-
gious soldiers in the Israel Defense Forces to resist the lawful com-
mands of officials representing a democratic majority.  Religious 
extremists have been willing to slaughter Muslims at prayer, and 
even to assassinate an Israeli prime minister.  While the shock waves 
from these events restrained some of the most incendiary utterances, 
the problem remains.39 
II. THE POLITICS OF TRADITIONAL JUDAISM IN A LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY40 
In most contemporary liberal democracies, these sharp, expli-
cit conflicts are relatively rare.  In the United States, especially, the 
“free exercise” clause of the First Amendment offers substantial pro-
tections to those seeking to live in accordance with the dictates of 
their faith.41
 
 Traditional Jews therefore join many other communities 
of faith in urging an expansive reading of this constitutional lan-
guage.  In 1990, the Supreme Court handed down a decision that re-
 
                                                                                                                                      
39 See Daniel J. Elazar, Israel as a Jewish State, JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUB. AFF., 
http://jcpa.org/dje/articles2/isrjewstate.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).  
40 See generally Galston, supra note 14, at 130-33 (discussing the difficulties in enforcing 
religious laws and man-made laws).  Editor’s Note: The following section is reprinted from 
the aforementioned source with additional commentary. 
41 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (ensuring separation of church and state). 
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duced protections for free exercise by lowering the standard that gov-
ernment must meet to justify legal interference with religious practic-
es.42  Traditional Jews participated in a broad coalition to resist and 
reverse this decision by enacting the “Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act” (RFRA).43  This proposal, adopted by the Congress and signed 
into law by President Clinton in late 1993, required government to 
show that its interference was made necessary by a “compelling” in-
terest and that the proposed intervention represented the least intru-
sive means of promoting that interest.44  The Supreme Court subse-
quently invalidated RFRA as applied to the states,45
 
but upheld it as 
applied the federal government.46 
Liberal democracies can act in ways that either relax or ex-
acerbate the conflict between civil and Torah law.  A number of con-
temporary political philosophers resist the strategy of accommoda-
tion in favor of policies that emphasize the force of “civic” claims 
and that pursue aims thought to be broadly desirable, regardless of 
their impact on particular communities of faith.47
 
 Brian Barry, a lead-
ing representative of this tendency, published a book arguing that 
civil concerns nearly always take priority and that cultural and reli-
gious claims rarely constitute grounds for objection or accommoda-
tion.48
 
 So, for example, the public demand to prevent (alleged) cruel-
ty to animals suffices to warrant the legal suppression of current 
kosher slaughtering practices.  This is not even a deprivation of reli-
gious liberty, Barry asserted, for the simple reason that “nobody is 
 
                                                                                                                                      
42 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) (finding that religious beliefs must 
still comply with civil law). 
43 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006). 
44 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2006). 
45 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997) (stating that Congress over-
reached its congressional authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
46 See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436 
(2006); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725-26 (2005) (reaffirming the feasibility of con-
sidering religious exemptions on a case-by-case basis as applied to generally applicable 
rules). 
47 E.g., Bhikhu Parekh, Contemporary Liberal Responses to Diversity, in DEBATES IN 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN ANTHOLOGY 239, 246-47 (Derek Matravers & 
Jon Pike eds., 2003); Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the 
Ideal of Universal Citizenship, in DEBATES IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN 
ANTHOLOGY 219, 231 (Derek Matravers & Jon Pike eds., 2003); see also Kent Greenawalt, 
Refusals of Conscience: What Are They and When Should They Be Accommodated?, 9 AVE 
MARIA L. REV. 47, 65 (2010). 
48 BRIAN M. BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY (First Harvard Univ. Press 2002). 
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bound to eat meat.  (Some Orthodox Jews are vegetarians.)”49  Clear-
ly, traditional Jews must oppose all arguments of this form and urge 
instead that liberal democracy rightly understood embodies a pre-
sumption in favor of wide religious liberty that is overridden only in 
the event of a severe clash between religious practices and fundamen-
tal human interests that the state must defend.  The state may prevent 
human sacrifice, and it may require Jehovah’s Witnesses to permit 
their children to receive life-saving blood transfusions.50  But in 
enacting a general prohibition against the consumption of alcohol or 
other drugs, it must not prevent their sacramental use. 
While debates over conflicts between the demands of civil 
law and the requirements of faith are noisy, such conflicts are rela-
tively rare.  Much more usual is the opposite case, when civil law 
permits what Torah law forbids.  Under these circumstances, tradi-
tional Jews face a dual challenge: they must do their best to insulate 
their own communities against the temptations of a permissive cul-
tural environment, and they may do what seems prudently possible to 
foster changes in civil law that narrow the gap with (at least the spirit 
of) Torah law. 
I remarked earlier that living traditions contain multiple inter-
pretive possibilities and that the challenge facing traditional Jews is 
to find defensible interpretations of both authoritative Jewish texts 
and the United States Constitution that to the greatest extent possible 
closes the gap between the demands of faith and the demands of citi-
zenship.  A strategy that addresses this challenge has now come into 
view.  Following the Gerondian view, traditional Jews should ac-
knowledge not just the instrumental utility, but also the legitimacy, of 
secular political institutions that parallel and complement religious 
authority.  At the same time, traditional Jews should embrace an in-
terpretation of American constitutionalism that is liberal rather than 
civic republican—a view that regards the legitimate scope of demo-
cratic political power as limited in a manner that leaves space for the 
exercise of practices commanded by faith, limited only by the requi-
sites of public order and tranquility. 
While I write as an American Jew, I cannot resist concluding 
that traditional Jews in Israel would be well advised to embrace this 
 
                                                                                                                                      
49 Id. at 45. 
50 See In re McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 411, 413 (Mass. 1991) (weighing individual interests 
in religion and state interests in health and well-being). 
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same formula.  While it is legitimate to resist the incursion of state 
power into the sphere of religious law, it is not legitimate to co-opt 
state power to impose that law on others who may interpret it diffe-
rently or reject its authority altogether.  Nor is it legitimate to use pri-
vate communal force to do so.  Civil authority should do its best to 
accommodate traditionalists—for example, by refraining from activi-
ties that impede their full observance of Shabbat.  But civil authority 
has no choice but to resist the imposition of religious law on public 
services.  If observant communities wish to practice gender-separated 
seating in vehicles they communally own and operate, that is their 
business, but, they cannot rightly impose it on public vehicles whose 
routes cross their neighborhoods. 
Because dual sovereignty does not neatly separate spheres of 
authority, the possibility of clashing civil and religious commands 
always remains.  My point is that there are ways of remaining faithful 
to traditional Judaism while minimizing this zone of controversy.  It 
is regrettable that many observant Jews in Israel have not seized the 
opportunity to mute this conflict but rather seem determined to ex-
acerbate it.  For when they do, the consequences can be disruptive, 
even fatal. 
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